Drone Surveillance: The FAA’s Obligation to Respond to the Privacy Risks by Scott, Jeramie D.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 44
Number 3 Drone City Article 6
2017
Drone Surveillance: The FAA’s Obligation to
Respond to the Privacy Risks
Jeramie D. Scott
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeramie D. Scott, Drone Surveillance: The FAA’s Obligation to Respond to the Privacy Risks, 44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 767 (2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol44/iss3/6
  767
DRONE SURVEILLANCE:  THE FAA’S 
OBLIGATION TO RESPOND TO THE PRIVACY 
RISKS 
Jeramie D. Scott* 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 767 
I.  FAA Modernization Act ................................................................... 769 
A.  The FAA and the Petition for a Drone Privacy 
Rulemaking ............................................................................ 771 
B.  The FAA, Drones, and Privacy ........................................... 772 
C.  EPIC v. FAA ......................................................................... 775 
II.  Privacy Issues ..................................................................................... 776 
III.  Lack of Legal Protections ............................................................... 778 
A.  Fourth Amendment Law, Drones, and Aerial 
Surveillance ............................................................................ 780 
B.  The Third Party Doctrine and Drone Surveillance ........... 782 
IV.  Potential Market for Drone Data Collection ............................... 785 
V.  Importance of Privacy in Public ...................................................... 787 
VI.  Why the FAA Should Regulate Drones ....................................... 789 
A.  Privacy Must be Addressed to Safely Integrate Drones 
into the National Airspace ................................................... 789 
B.  The FAA Modernization Act Requires the FAA to 
Address Privacy Issues ......................................................... 790 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 792 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a scenario not too far off in the future where drones in the 
sky are a regular occurrence over densely populated urban areas.  
These drones do not need to be in the line of sight of an operator and 
do not need to be actively operated at all as they fly around 
autonomously.  Some of the drones you can see but more are present 
                                                                                                                                         
*  EPIC National Security Counsel and Director of EPIC’s Domestic Surveillance 
Project. 
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then the eye can discern.  Some are flying too high to see and are too 
quiet to hear. 
The drones constantly flying overhead are delivering packages, 
transporting people, monitoring traffic, checking infrastructure, 
providing building security, and monitoring the environment.  You 
know that the drones carry all sorts of high-tech equipment.  But you 
do not know exactly what technology is on the drone, what the 
surveillance capabilities are, what information these drones could be 
collecting about you and anyone else who happens to be in a public 
space, or how this information could be used or to whom the 
information could be disclosed.  Going into public essentially means 
giving up your privacy in a way never imagined before with little to no 
say in the matter.  To maintain any semblance of privacy in public 
requires extraordinary efforts that limit your ability to participate in 
modern society.  You do not carry your smartphone or any other 
mobile device that connects to the internet,1 you wear a hood and 
special tinted glasses to thwart ear,2 iris,3 and facial recognition,4 and 
you randomize your gait.5  You also wear gloves to prevent the 
capture of your fingerprints,6 avoid driving your own car,7 and avoid 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Mobile devices periodically emit a wireless signal, referred to as a probe, to 
find wireless networks to connect to and these probes includes a unique number 
called a media access control (“MAC”) address, which can be used to track your 
movements. Latanya Sweeney, My Phone at Your Service, FED. TRADE COMM’N 
(Feb. 12, 2014, 4:15 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2014/02/my-
phone-your-service [https://perma.cc/D5AK-H9SP]. 
 2. Your ear may someday unlock your phone just like your finger. See Teo 
Armus, Use Your Ear to Unlock Your Phone, PSFK (June 30, 2015), 
https://www.psfk.com/2015/06/amazon-fire-ear-recognition-technology-amazon-
patent.html [https://perma.cc/XH5X-E2HV]. 
 3. The distance at which iris recognition can be performed is increasing. See 
Robinson Meyer, Long-Range Iris Scanning Is Here, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/05/long-range-iris-scanning-is-
here/393065/ [https://perma.cc/CGK3-MJ6R]. 
 4. Facial recognition thwarting glasses are already a thing. Alex Perala, New 
Glasses Can Thwart Facial Recognition, FIND BIOMETRICS (Aug. 10, 2015), 
http://findbiometrics.com/glasses-thwart-facial-recognition-8104/ 
[https://perma.cc/6VGA-WX9L]. 
 5. Gait analysis is now used more frequently to identify individuals. See Jim 
Giles, Cameras Know You by Your Walk, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept. 19, 2012), 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528835-600-cameras-know-you-by-your-
walk/ [https://perma.cc/U3HX-8LQG]. 
 6. A digital fingerprint can now be lifted from a sufficiently high-resolution 
photo. See Andy Boxall, Careful, Your Fun Peace Sign Selfie May Lead to Identity 
Theft, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 11, 2017, 3:58 AM), http://www.digital
trends.com/mobile/peace-sign-selfie-fingerprint-identity-theft-news/ 
[https://perma.cc/M9Q9-K93L]; see also Alex Hern, Hacker Fakes German Minister’s 
Fingerprints Using Photos of Her Hands, GUARDIAN (last updated Feb. 21, 2017), 
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using the new self-driving/flying drone cars8—you stick to walking, 
biking, or mass public transportation. 
The description above sounds a lot like the beginning of a 
dystopian novel, but it is the current track we are on as drones are 
being integrated into the National Airspace with no privacy 
protections for public space.  In 2012, the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”) was tasked by Congress with integrating 
drones into the National Airspace.  Five years later, the agency is still 
working on domestic drone integration but refuses to address privacy 
as the agency works to establish safety rules for drones despite 
identifying privacy as an important issue to address as drones are 
integrated into the National Airspace.9 
Part I of this Article discusses the FAA Modernization and Reform 
Act of 2012.  The subsections of this Part will discuss some of the 
relevant details of the Act, the petition of the FAA to address drone 
privacy after the Act was passed, and the FAA’s changing 
relationship with privacy.  Part II highlights the privacy issues created 
by the integration of drones.  Part III will look at the lack of legal 
protections for privacy in public, and Part IV will provide an example 
of how these lack of protections provide incentives for companies to 
amass data on individuals in public for financial gain.  Part V will 
discuss why privacy in public is so important, and Part VI will provide 
reasons why the FAA needs to address privacy as the agency 
integrates drones.  Finally, the Article provides some concluding 
thoughts, including the most important action the FAA could force 
drone companies to do. 
I.  FAA MODERNIZATION ACT 
On February 14, 2012, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012 (“FAA Modernization Act” or “the Act”) was enacted, 
requiring the Federal Aviation Administration to establish drone 
regulations and implement drones into the National Airspace System 
(“National Airspace”).10  The Act established a number of 
                                                                                                                                         
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/30/hacker-fakes-german-
ministers-fingerprints-using-photos-of-her-hands [https://perma.cc/7UHP-J9D2]. 
 7. See Kaveh Waddell, Amazon Wants to Scan Your License Plate, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/amazon-
wants-to-scan-your-license-plate/503747/ [https://perma.cc/KV6L-6BY7]. 
 8. See generally Pop.Up:  Urban Transport Reimagined, AIRBUS, http://airbus-
xo.com/pop-up-urban-transport-reimagined/ [https://perma.cc/5M5W-R3NU]. 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. (2012)). 
770 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
requirements and deadlines for the FAA to meet.  Section 332 of the 
Act requires the FAA to develop a “Comprehensive Plan” to 
integrate drones into the National Airspace.11  The Comprehensive 
Plan was to be finished no later than 270 days after the FAA 
Modernization Act became law.12  Congress set minimum 
requirements for the plan, including projections on the required 
public drone rulemaking with specific recommendations on “how the 
rulemaking will—” 
(i) define the acceptable standards for operation and certification of 
civil unmanned aircraft systems; (ii) ensure that any civil unmanned 
aircraft system includes a sense and avoid capability; and (iii) 
establish standards and requirements for the operator and pilot of a 
civil unmanned aircraft system, including standards and 
requirements for registration and licensing . . .13 
The Comprehensive Plan was due to Congress within one year of 
the FAA Modernization Act becoming law.14  At the same time 
Congress required the submission of the Comprehensive Plan, it also 
required the FAA to develop a five-year roadmap (“the Roadmap”) 
for the introduction of drones into the National Airspace.15 
The Act requires the FAA to implement the recommendations of 
the Comprehensive Plan through a public notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.16  The notice for the Comprehensive Plan rulemaking 
was due within eighteen months after the Comprehensive Plan was 
due to Congress.17  The final rule was then to be published within 
sixteen months after the notice of the Comprehensive Plan 
rulemaking.18  Using all the deadlines set by Congress and adding up 
the months, the final rule was to be published within forty-six months 
of the enactment of the FAA Modernization Act, which would have 
been in December 2015.19 
The FAA has completely failed to adhere to the timeline 
established by Congress.  As of April 2017, over sixty months had 
passed since the enactment of the FAA Modernization Act, and not 
even the notice for the rulemaking to implement the Comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. Id. § 332(a)(1). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. § 332(a)(2). 
 14. Id. § 332(a)(4). 
 15. Id. §§ 332(a)(4), 332(a)(5). 
 16. Id. § 332(b). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. § 332(b)(2). 
 19. See id. §§ 332(a)(4), 332(b). 
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Plan has been published.   The Comprehensive Plan itself has been 
published but even that was delivered to Congress nearly nine months 
later than required.20 
A. The FAA and the Petition for a Drone Privacy Rulemaking 
Although the FAA has not yet conducted the rulemaking to 
implement the Comprehensive Plan as required by Congress, the 
agency has conducted one rulemaking on drone integration related to 
small commercial drones.21  That small drone rulemaking seemingly 
highlighted a reversal by the agency to address privacy in a formal 
way as it worked to integrate drones into the National Airspace.22  
The notice for the rulemaking stated that privacy was “beyond the 
scope of this rulemaking” and concluded that the agency had no 
jurisdiction to regulate drone privacy.23 
This statement and conclusion in the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (“NPRM”) for the small drone rulemaking seemingly 
went against the FAA’s previous actions and words, as well as 
congressional intent.  To understand why, this Article looks at the 
agency’s history with privacy as it relates to drones. 
As previously mentioned, the FAA Modernization Act became law 
in February 2012.  Immediately after the enactment of the Act, the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”)24 led a coalition of 
organizations, legal scholars, and technology experts to petition the 
FAA to establish drone privacy rules—noting that “[t]he increased 
use of drones poses an ongoing threat to every person residing within 
                                                                                                                                         
 20. See Letter from Anthony R. Foxx, U.S. Sec’y of Transp., to Hon. John D. 
Rockefeller IV, Chairman, Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., U.S. Senate, et al. (Nov. 
6, 2013). 
 21. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 
Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, et 
al.); FAA Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 42,064 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.). 
 22. As explained later in this section, the FAA had indicated in its response to a 
drone privacy petition brought by EPIC that the agency would consider privacy in 
the small drone rulemaking but when the notice came out for the rulemaking, the 
FAA stated privacy was outside the scope. 
 23. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. 
Reg. at 9544, 9552. 
 24. The petition to the FAA was led by the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (“EPIC”), a public interest research center based in Washington, DC that 
focuses public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberty issues. See EPIC, 
https://epic.org, https://perma.cc/L2S3-N4C8. 
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the United States.”25  Specifically, the petition called upon the FAA 
to conduct a separate rulemaking on the privacy issues raised by 
drones in the National Airspace.26 
Nearly two and a half years after the EPIC-led coalition petitioned 
the FAA to conduct a drone privacy rulemaking, the agency 
responded.27  In the FAA’s response, the agency stated that “[a]fter 
reviewing [EPIC’s petition], we have determined that the issue you 
have raised is not an immediate safety concern.”28  But, the agency 
also explained that “the FAA has begun a rulemaking addressing civil 
operation of small unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace 
system.  We will consider your comments and arguments as part of 
that project.”29  During that very project however, the FAA abruptly 
reversed the agency’s prior response to the EPIC-led coalition 
petition for drone privacy rules, stating in the notice-of-proposed 
rulemaking for small drones that privacy was “beyond the scope of 
this rulemaking.”30  This decision was made all the more befuddling 
given the agency’s prior work up to this point, including soliciting 
public comments on a privacy policy for the drone test sites required 
by the FAA Modernization Act.31 
B. The FAA, Drones, and Privacy 
After the FAA Modernization Act was passed in 2012, the FAA 
appeared to embrace privacy as the agency went through the process 
of integrating drones into the National Airspace.  Within two months 
of the Act becoming law, Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA) and 
Representative Joe Barton (R-TX) sent a letter to the FAA with 
several questions focused on privacy and the integration of drones 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. Letter from EPIC et al., to Michael P. Huerta, Fed. Aviation Acting Admin. 
(Feb. 24, 2012), https://epic.org/apa/lawsuit/EPIC-FAA-Drone-Petition-March-8-
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWZ7-2QNH]. 
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. Letter from Lirio Liu, Dir., Off. of Rulemaking, Fed. Aviation Admin., to 
Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., EPIC (Nov. 26, 2014), https://epic.org/privacy/
drones/FAA-Privacy-Rulemaking-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/A368-ETN7] 
[hereinafter Liu Letter]. 
 28. Id. at 1. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 9544, 9552 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015). 
 31. Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,259 (proposed Feb. 22, 
2013). 
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into the National Airspace.32  The legislators noted that although 
drones will have their benefits, they also “enable invasive and 
pervasive surveillance without adequate privacy protections.”33  The 
legislators wanted to know “how the FAA is addressing” the privacy 
implications of drones.34  Markey and Barton noted that the 
rulemaking process required by the FAA Modernization Act 
afforded the agency the “opportunity and responsibility to ensure that 
privacy of individuals is protected and that the public is fully informed 
about who is using drones in the public airspace and why.”35 
In response to the letter, the FAA acknowledged the privacy risks 
associated with drones, stating, “[t]he FAA recognizes that there are 
privacy concerns related to UAS operations, and the agency will 
review these concerns in the context of the ongoing UAS rulemaking 
activities and integration plans.”36  Indeed, one of the early 
requirements of the FAA Modernization Act was the establishment 
of drone test sites, and the FAA not only proposed privacy provisions 
for the test sites, but also solicited feedback from the public on the 
provisions.37 
The FAA’s acknowledgement of the privacy risks raised by drones 
did not end with the agency’s response to a letter from congressional 
members asking about drones and privacy, or soliciting comments on 
a privacy policy for drone test sites.  The core documents required by 
the FAA Modernization Act, the Roadmap and the Comprehensive 
Plan, to guide the integration of drones into the National Airspace 
were very explicit about privacy being an important issue to address 
with drone integration.38 
                                                                                                                                         
 32. Letter from S. Markey & Rep. Barton, to Michael P. Huerta, Fed. Aviation 
Acting Admin. (Apr. 19, 2012), https://fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/drones041912.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/97AN-UFCQ]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Letter from Fed. Aviation Acting Admin., Michael P. Huerta, to S. Markey 
(Sept. 21, 2012). 
 37. Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,259 (proposed Feb. 22, 
2013); see also Letter from Kathryn B. Thomson, Fed. Aviation Admin. Chief 
Counsel, to Marc Rotenberg, President, EPIC (Feb. 14, 2013). 
 38. See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) ROADMAP 
(2013), https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/UAS_Roadmap_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PT2R-XUSU] [hereinafter ROADMAP]; JOINT PLAN. & DEV. OFF., UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (Sept. 2013), https://www.faa.gov/
about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/UAS_Comprehensive_Plan.
pdf [https://perma.cc/MP92-WTEZ] [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE PLAN]. 
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The FAA Modernization Act required the creation of “a 5-year 
Roadmap for the introduction of civil unmanned aircraft systems into 
the national airspace system.”39  The Roadmap includes a section 
entitled “Privacy and Civil Liberties Considerations.”40  In this 
section, the FAA recognizes that the potential increase in drones in 
the National Airspace “raises questions as to how to accomplish UAS 
integration in a manner that is consistent with privacy and civil 
liberties considerations.”41  The Roadmap does state that the “FAA’s 
mission does not include developing or enforcing policies pertaining 
to privacy or civil liberties.”42  However, this statement does not 
preclude the agency from addressing privacy, and Congress also gave 
the FAA wide latitude and a mandate to address the issues associated 
with integrating drones and only insisted on minimum requirements 
for the scope of the Comprehensive Plan.43 
The Act required a comprehensive plan that would make 
recommendations as to what issues needed to be addressed as part of 
integrating drones into the National Airspace, and was explicit that 
the recommendations of the Comprehensive Plan be implemented 
through public rulemaking.44  The FAA’s Comprehensive Plan was 
equally explicit in the need to address privacy, stating that 
“[m]embers of the NextGen SPC agree on the need to address 
privacy concerns of the public at large while safely integrating UAS in 
the NAS.”45  The Next Generation Air Transportation Senior Policy 
Committee (“Nextgen SPC”) is chaired by the Secretary of 
Transportation and includes as it members the following individuals 
or their designee:  the Administrator of the FAA, the Administrator 
of NASA, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy.46  Despite the many statements by 
the FAA regarding the importance of addressing the privacy 
implications of drones, when it came time to actually address privacy 
in the small drone rulemaking, the FAA shied away from the subject. 
                                                                                                                                         
 39. Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 § 332(b)(5) (2012). 
 40. ROADMAP, supra note 38. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 § 332(a)(1). 
 44. Id. at §§ 332(a)-(b). 
 45. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 38, at 7. 
 46. The Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-
176, § 710(b), 117 Stat. 2490, 2584 (2003). 
2017] DRONE PRIVACY RISKS AND THE FAA 775 
C. EPIC v. FAA 
Although not the focus of this Article, to give a more complete 
view of the FAA and drone privacy, it is worth briefly describing the 
challenges brought by EPIC—a public interest organization focused 
on emerging privacy issues—against the FAA for the agency’s failure 
to address the privacy risks raised by drones. 
When the FAA denied EPIC’s petition for a separate public 
rulemaking on drone privacy issues, the agency pointed to the 
upcoming small drone rulemaking as the appropriate opportunity for 
EPIC, other organizations, and the public to comment on concerns 
with privacy.47  As discussed earlier, when it came time for the FAA 
to issue the notice-of-proposed rulemaking, the agency reversed 
course and stated that privacy was outside the scope of the 
rulemaking.48 
In response to the reversal by the FAA to consider privacy in the 
small drone rulemaking, EPIC filed a petition for review with the 
D.C. Circuit.  EPIC brought two challenges:  1) for the agency’s 
denial of EPIC’s petition; and 2) for the agency’s failure to consider 
privacy in the context of the small drone rulemaking.49 The D.C. 
Circuit ruled that with respect to the first challenge, EPIC was time-
barred.50  Concerning the second challenge, the Court ruled that the 
challenge was premature because the small drone rulemaking was not 
a final reviewable order.51  The final rule for the small drone 
rulemaking was published in June 2016 and since then EPIC has filed 
another petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, which includes a 
challenge to the final rule.52  As of April 2017, the case is still pending 
before the D.C. Circuit.  As the integration of drones continues and 
drone technology rapidly advances, whether the FAA is forced to 
                                                                                                                                         
 47. Liu Letter, supra note 27. 
 48. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 9544, 9552 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015). 
 49. EPIC v. FAA, 821 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 50. Id. at 41.  EPIC was time-barred because the organization did not file a 
petition to review within the sixty days required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act.  Additionally, the Court did not agree with EPIC that FAA’s response was an 
ambiguous denial at best given the fact the agency stated it would consider privacy in 
an upcoming rulemaking. 
 51. Id.  Under the Administrative Procedure Act, only a final action can typically 
be challenged and a notice of a proposed rule is not typically considered a final action 
and was not in this case despite the arguments of EPIC that the notice represented 
the final response (i.e. the denial) to EPIC’s petition when the agency stated in the 
notice that privacy was outside the scope of the rulemaking. 
 52. Petition for Review, EPIC v. FAA, 821 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 16-
1297). 
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address privacy concerns may have long-lasting implications for our 
privacy in public space. 
II.  PRIVACY ISSUES 
Drones can carry sophisticated surveillance equipment, and “by 
virtue of their design, their size, and how [high] they can fly, [drones] 
can operate undetected in urban and rural environments.”53  The 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (“DARPA”) created 
the Autonomous Real-time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance-Infrared 
(“ARGUS-IR”) system, which enables “a persistent, real-time, high-
resolution, wide-area, day-night video survelliance capability”54  The 
field of view is roughly sixty-five square miles and ARGUS-IR can 
track sixty-five objects within that field of view at the same time.55  
The U.S. Army mounted the ARGUS-IR on a drone capable of 
hovering for over twenty hours at an altitude in excess of 15,000 
feet.56  Drones in general are a flexible platform for various 
surveillance technologies and can be equipped with long-range zoom 
lenses, thermal imaging, night vision, radar, facial recognition and 
other biometric recognition capabilities, automated-license plate 
readers, and other sensors to gather personal information.57 
What does all the technology available to drones mean for privacy?  
Simply put, it means drones pose a unique threat to privacy in public.  
Drones greatly increase the capacity for domestic surveillance 
because drones provide a cheap aerial surveillance platform to which 
numerous surveillance technologies can be attached.  Although aerial 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 10, 
2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you 
[https://perma.cc/F6CB-7BM8]. 
 54. DARPA, DEP’T OF DEF. FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2014 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 
SUBMISSION, Exhibit R-2A, 13 (2013), http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/(2G3)
%20Global%20Nav%20-%20About%20Us%20-%20Budget%20-%20Budget%20
Entries%20-%20FY2014%20(Approved).pdf [https://perma.cc/3D2F-BYBH]. 
 55. US Army Unveils 1.8 Gigapixel Camera Helicopter Drone, BBC NEWS (Mar. 
8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16358851 [https://perma.cc/4B7D-
AVCE]. 
 56. See David Hambling, Special Forces’ Gigapixel Flying Spy Eyes All, WIRED 
(Feb. 12, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/02/gigapixel-flyin/ [https://perma.cc/
ML9R-LKL5]. 
 57. Ciara Bracken-Roche et al., Surveillance Drones:  Privacy Implications of the 
Spread of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Canada, SURVEILLANCE STUD. 
CTR. 18-19 (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/files/Surveillance_
Drones_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QBC-3UVQ]. 
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surveillance has been possible for some time, drones will alter both 
the economics and industry of aerial surveillance.58 
Before drones, conducting aerial surveillance required the use of a 
helicopter or airplane.  The expense of using either created three 
restrictions:  1) who could use airplanes or helicopters for aerial 
surveillance; 2) how often an airplane or helicopter could be used for 
aerial surveillance; and 3) for what purpose aerial surveillance would 
be used.59  The economic limitations meant very few people had 
access to aerial surveillance, aerial surveillance was not used 
frequently, and the purposes for which aerial surveillance were used 
were narrow because the surveillance had to be worth the expense.60  
Under these circumstances, mass aerial surveillance was not practical. 
Drones, however, have changed the economics of aerial 
surveillance, making it accessible to practically anyone.  This change 
in economics also expanded the industry for aerial surveillance.61  
Drones are being built specifically for aerial surveillance to conduct 
environmental monitoring, infrastructure inspection, and agricultural 
workflow among many other applications.62  The increased industry 
around drones means drone technology advances at an accelerated 
rate.  Drones will eventually fly autonomously and carry increasingly 
sophisticated equipment.63  And as drones get safer, more will fly 
                                                                                                                                         
 58. I am using the term surveillance in a broad manner that does not require 
observation by a person but encompasses any collecting of data or information that 
can be uniquely connected to an individual. 
 59. See Richard M. Thompson II, Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations:  
Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses, CONG. RES. CTR. 16 
(Apr. 3, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VEC-
ZULB]. 
 60. In practice this meant only the government generally had the ability to 
occasionally conduct aerial surveillance operations for targeted purposes (i.e., not 
mass, persistent aerial surveillance). 
 61. The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the 
United States, AUVSI 2 (Mar. 2013), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazon
aws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-9807-f9a4e95d1ef1/UploadedImages/New_
Economic%20Report%202013%20Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZU6-KVHP] 
(estimating that the drone industry will generate more than eighty-two billion dollars 
in economic impact and account for over 100,000 jobs). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Boeing has a patent for an autonomous drone that can be recharged through a 
tether at a charging station. Benjamin Zhang, Boeing Just Patented a Drone That 
Can Fly Forever, BUS. INSIDER (June 5, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/
boeing-patent-mid-air-rechargeable-drones-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/TCC8-FDN3].  
Raytheon has a patent that, based on the purpose of the drone, will identify the 
important surveillance data for human review. Vlad Shvartsman, Raytheon Patent 
Cherry-picks Relevant Data, UAV PATENT BLOG (July 12, 2015), http://www.uav
patents.com/raytheon-patent-cherry-picks-relevant-data/ [https://perma.cc/7K8M-
GEQN]. 
778 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
over densely packed urban areas when delivering packages and 
providing other services.  The omnipresence of drones over urban 
areas is ripe for the creation of drone mass surveillance for the 
purpose of commercial data collection.  This will undermine our 
privacy in public in ways that will have a fundamental impact on our 
interaction in public space and participation in society. 
An abundance of information can be gathered about individuals in 
public if drones are allowed to freely collect personal information in 
public space.  Drones will have a multitude of ways to identify 
individuals with the ability to add facial recognition, license plate 
readers, MAC address or Wi-Fi tracking, and other capabilities to 
identify and track people.  Drones, with these capabilities onboard, 
will be able to track individuals’ movements in public space and 
collect information about where an individual goes on a daily basis 
and who an individual interacts with. Information about what church 
you attend, what doctors you’ve seen recently, what protests you’ve 
participated in, and what stores or other businesses you have entered 
could all be collected by various drones flying around the city and 
aggregated in one large database.64  Furthermore, all this information 
could be subjected to big data analysis by sophisticated algorithms in 
order to glean additional information from the data.65  The 
surveillance of the public by commercial entities might be a by-
product of drones flying around for other reasons (e.g., delivering 
packages) or might be done specifically for financial gain and to 
provide law enforcement access to a wealth of data on the people in a 
particular city.66  Without any legal protections for privacy in public 
this is the reality we face. 
III.  LACK OF LEGAL PROTECTIONS 
Privacy law in the United States is generally a siloed affair.  There 
is no overarching law or laws that provide general privacy protections 
for individuals for potentially sensitive, personal information from 
                                                                                                                                         
 64. In 2016 a private citizen hired Persistent Surveillance Systems to fly a small 
plane over Baltimore, Maryland to collect and retain surveillance of the city.  The 
plane was equipped with a wide-area, real-time surveillance system that covered 
around thirty square miles that was described as “Google Earth with TiVo 
capability.” Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move From 
Above, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-
baltimore-secret-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/J68N-2EPF]. 
 65. See Bracken-Roche, supra note 57, at 46 (“Mass data collection afforded 
through the persistent data capture capabilities of UAVs can . . . collect a wealth of 
‘ambient’ information across a wide range of terrestrial environments, including the 
people, objects, and behaviours that are occurring within them.”). 
 66. See Reel, supra note 64. 
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commercial actors.  The laws that provide privacy protections are 
very specific, in isolated areas, evidenced by the names of the laws.  
For example, the Video Privacy Protection Act, Drivers Privacy 
Protection Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 
Right to Financial Privacy Act, and Children’s Online Privacy and 
Protection Act.67 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures by government actors.68  These protections 
from a government search remain in place even when the government 
is trying to perform the search by going through a commercial entity 
that has already performed the search if the commercial entity is 
acting as an agent of the government.69 For example, if a warrant was 
required to perform mass, indiscriminate surveillance with a drone of 
a city block, the authorities could not avoid the warrant requirement 
by getting the exact same surveillance data from a company like 
Persistent Surveillance Systems that actually does perform mass, 
indiscriminate aerial surveillance on behalf of law enforcement.70  
Currently, police can freely perform surveillance on any scale in 
public space without obtaining a warrant, and thus would not need a 
warrant to get the same data from a commercial entity.  Fourth 
Amendment protections largely fall away in the context of 
information freely exposed to the public.71 
Not only does the Fourth Amendment not protect data exposed to 
the public, it does not protect data voluntarily given to a third party.72  
If, for example, you signed up with a company to have the drones 
flying above constantly track your location in order to send 
personalized ads or coupons based on where you happen to be at any 
given moment, that location information can be obtained by the 
police without a warrant from the company using drones to track your 
movement—even if the location data was deemed the type of 
information that required a search warrant to obtain.  The ability of 
law enforcement to obtain information about individuals from 
companies that interact with those individuals further undermines 
what protections the Fourth Amendment does provide. 
                                                                                                                                         
 67. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel Solove, Information Privacy Statutes and 
Regulations 2008-2009 vii-viii, https://www.informationprivacylaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/IPL-Statutes-TOC.pdf [https://perma.cc/57BP-XGBT]. 
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 69. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
 70. See Reel, supra note 64. 
 71. See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion. 
 72. This is referred to as the third-party doctrine.  See infra Parts III-IV for a 
discussion of the third-party doctrine. 
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A. Fourth Amendment Law, Drones, and Aerial Surveillance 
The current state of the law means there is little to no protection 
for privacy in public space.  Consequently, drones flying in our 
National Airspace are free to collect any data that is readily available 
from a public vantage point.  This is particularly true for private 
commercial entities to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply.  
Thus individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
against commercial entities in the same way they do against the 
government.73  The privacy implications are further heightened by 
how the courts have applied the reasonable expectation of privacy to 
public space and the third-party doctrine, which will allow law 
enforcement to access data collected by commercial drones without a 
warrant when the information is collected in public space or the 
information is voluntarily handed over.74 
Under the Fourth Amendment, people are protected from 
unreasonable searches and seizures by a standard known as the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”  The reasonable expectation of 
privacy test was first articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz v. United States.75  In Katz, the government had placed an 
electronic listening device outside a public phone booth to listen to 
the defendant’s phone conversation.76  The government used the 
defendant’s side of the conversation as evidence in the case over the 
objection of the defendant.77  Katz argued that the phone booth was a 
constitutionally protected space under the Fourth Amendment; the 
government argued that the phone booth was not constitutionally 
protected.78 
The Court rejected the parties’ formulation of the issue that 
focused on whether the phone booth was a constitutionally protected 
area, famously stating “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”79  The Court explained that “[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection.”80  Based on this formulation of 
the issue, the Court found that “[t]he Government’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words 
                                                                                                                                         
 73. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. 
 74. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 348. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 351. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the 
telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”81  In other words, Katz had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation in the phone 
booth.  Having found that a search was conducted, the Court went on 
to analyze whether the search was permissible under the Constitution 
and found it was not.82  The Court consequently reversed Katz’s 
conviction.83 
The majority opinion alluded to the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test, but it was in Justice Harlan’s concurrence that the 
specific test was expressed.  In his concurrence, Justice Harlan 
articulated his understanding of the rule used in Katz and prior 
decisions, stating “that there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”84 
As articulated and applied, the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test does not generally extend to information that “a person 
knowingly exposes to the public.”85  This reasoning was reflected in 
two Supreme Court cases that addressed aerial surveillance. 
The Court considered whether aerial surveillance was a violation of 
privacy and the Fourth Amendment in California v. Ciraolo86 and 
Florida v. Riley.87  In both cases, the Court found that law 
enforcement’s observation from public airspace did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.88 
In Ciraolo, police, acting on an anonymous tip, flew over the 
defendant’s house in a private plane and were able to identify 
marijuana growing in the yard.89  Despite the officers viewing a 
fenced-in backyard, the Court reasoned that “officer’s observations 
                                                                                                                                         
 81. Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 354-59. 
 83. Id. at 359. 
 84. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 351. 
 86. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 87. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 88. Interestingly, both cases indicated that what the officers could see with their 
“naked eye” from public airspace was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
The “naked eye” line could be used to distinguish aerial observation from a manned-
vehicle verse a drone but currently such a challenge has not been made and police 
readily use drones without warrants where specific state laws have not restricted 
them from doing so. 
 89. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. 
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from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which 
renders the activities clearly visible” do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.90 
Similarly, in Riley the police were acting on an anonymous tip and 
flew a helicopter over a mobile home that had greenhouses located 
near it.91  The greenhouses generally obscured the contents inside 
except for some missing roofing panels.92  Through these missing 
panels, the police were able to identify marijuana in the greenhouse.93  
The Court in Riley, like in Ciraolo, argued the police “were likewise 
free to inspect the yard form the vantage point of an aircraft flying in 
the navigable airspace . . . .”94  
Thus information exposed to the public, even if only exposed from 
aerial vantage points, can freely be collected by law enforcement 
drones.95  Even though one may have a subjective expectation of 
privacy in public space, particularly in the aggregation of the data 
exposed while in public and any information that can be derived from 
the analysis of that data, this subjective expectation of privacy is not 
one the courts have recognized as accepted by the public.96 
B. The Third Party Doctrine and Drone Surveillance 
The lack of privacy in public is exacerbated by the third-party 
doctrine, which gives no Fourth Amendment protection to 
information freely given to a third party.  The origins of the third-
party doctrine are found within United States v. Miller.97  In that case, 
Miller claimed Fourth Amendment protections for his banking 
records that were accessed by the government without a judicial 
warrant.98  The Court ruled that Miller had no Fourth Amendment 
interest in his bank records that were revealed and consequently 
conveyed to the government by a third party (i.e. the bank).99  The 
                                                                                                                                         
 90. Id. at 213. 
 91. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 450. 
 95. Also, law enforcement can just get the information directly from the drone 
companies without the need for a warrant. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying 
text. 
 96. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.  But see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that individuals may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their public movements). 
 97. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 98. Id. at 436. 
 99. Id. at 445. 
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third-party doctrine was largely solidified in Smith v. Maryland.100  In 
Smith, the Court ruled that the defendant did not have a Fourth 
Amendment interest in the phone numbers he dialed that were 
consequently passed to the phone company and collected by the 
government, stating “[t]his Court consistently has held that a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
turns over to third parties.”101 
In 2012, the Court in United States v. Jones began to recognize the 
problems with the third-party doctrine in a digital age,102 but the cases 
that established the doctrine still remain binding precedent.  In Jones, 
the government installed a global positioning system (“GPS”) 
tracking device on a vehicle used by Jones.103  The GPS device was 
installed on the vehicle while it was on private property, the day after 
the warrant expired, and in Maryland instead of the District of 
Columbia, where the warrant authorized installation.104  The 
government subsequently tracked the vehicle for twenty-eight days.105  
The Court reviewed the lower court’s decision that the warrantless 
attachment of the GPS device and the subsequent tracking 
constituted a search, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.106  In 
the majority opinion by the Court, written by Justice Scalia, the Court 
did not analyze whether a search occurred using the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, instead using the common-law trespassory 
test.107  In the concurrence, Justice Sotomayor wrote “[w]hen the 
Government physically invades personal property to gather 
information, a search occurs.”108  With respect to collecting the same 
GPS data without a trespass, Justice Scalia suggested “[i]t may be that 
achieving the same result through electronic means, without an 
accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but 
the present case does not require us to answer that question.”109 
Although the majority opinion in Jones did not address whether 
GPS tracking for an extended period of time constitutes a search 
under the reasonable expectation of privacy test, a majority of 
Justices agreed that it did in the concurrences.  Both Justice Alito and 
                                                                                                                                         
 100. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 101. Id. at 745. 
 102. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 103. Id. at 403. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 404 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 107. Id. at 409. 
 108. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 412. 
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Justice Sotomayor wrote concurrences supporting a reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis that found that the GPS tracking 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.110  Justice Alito’s 
concurrence was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.111  
Those four justices combined with Justice Sotomayor constitute what 
has been referred to as a “shadow majority.”112 
Both the Alito concurrence and Sotomayor concurrence show 
concern for the prospect of creating the same compilation of GPS 
data as in Jones, but without any physical intrusion.113  Justice 
Sotomayor acknowledged the growing issue of the third-party 
doctrine in our digital society, stating: 
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.  This approach is ill suited to the digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.114 
Justice Sotomayor’s position that the Court should reconsider the 
third-party doctrine is a step in the right direction, if only a partial 
one.  Unfortunately, information freely exposed to the public that a 
drone can collect may need more protection than a new precedent 
that overturns the third-party doctrine.  In the cases that established 
the third-party doctrine, the data in question was only given to a 
distinct and definable third party, leaving room to distinguish data 
collected strictly from public space since that data is, in some sense, 
freely exposed to the public.115  On the other hand, many of the risks 
associated with GPS tracking highlighted by Justice Sotomayor in her 
concurrence are applicable to mass surveillance by drones of public 
space.  For example, in Jones, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged the 
chilling effect to First Amendment associational and expressive 
                                                                                                                                         
 110. Id. at 413-18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418-19 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 111. Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 112. The “shadow majority” references the fact that the reasoning in the 
concurrences was not the basis of the majority opinion, but does suggest that the 
Court would have had enough judges to consider long-term GPS tracking a search 
under the reasonable expectation of privacy test. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Courts grapple 
with the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment, WASH. POST:  VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/04/28/courts-grapple-with-the-mosaic-theory-of-the-fourth-
amendment [https://perma.cc/Y5P3-AC9V] 
 113. Jones, 565 U.S. at 413-18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418-19 (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 114. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 115. Id. at 418. 
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freedoms.116  A similar chilling effect occurs with drone surveillance.  
Drones typically carry their own GPS devices, and with surveillance 
payloads that might include multiple ways to identify an individual, 
drones have the capacity to conduct the kind of long term GPS 
tracking Justice Sotomayor suggested has a chilling effect on First 
Amendment rights. 
IV.  POTENTIAL MARKET FOR DRONE DATA COLLECTION 
The general lack of privacy protections in public space and the 
third-party doctrine create the possibility of mass surveillance by the 
private sector that will be fully accessible by law enforcement without 
the requirement for a judicial warrant.  Indeed, businesses may 
purposefully collect data for the benefit, in part, of law enforcement 
agencies.  Drones will fly over populated urban areas with an array of 
sophisticated equipment that can and will be used to collect data 
about the surrounding environment, including the people in that 
environment. 
Without some baseline rules or regulations, drones could greatly 
increase the commercial industry of selling law enforcement access to 
databases of information obtained through the mass surveillance of 
public space.  This type of market has developed with the technology 
of Automated License Plate Readers (“ALPRs”).117  Companies have 
taken advantage of the lack of privacy protections in public space to 
aggregate massive databases on the public. 
Many law enforcement agencies pay for access to data collected by 
the private sector.  Vigilant Solutions and its subsidiary, Digital 
Recognition Network (“DRN”) are two of the many providers of 
license plate data to law enforcement.118  Vigilant Solutions only sells 
its data to law enforcement officers.119  DRN sells its data to a variety 
of third parties, including banks, the auto repossession industry, 
college security, and private investigators.120 
                                                                                                                                         
 116. Id. at 416. 
 117. Steve Orr, License Plate Data is Big Business, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/02/license-plate-data-is-big-
business/18370791/ [https://perma.cc/RAK5-D25Z]. 
 118. Vigilant Solutions, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, http://drndata.com/
company/vigilant-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/2R9J-6T4X]; DIG. RECOGNITION 
NETWORK, http://drndata.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/ZX4F-7YJV]. 
 119. See National Vehicle Location Service, VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, http://vigilant
solutions.com/products/nvls [https://perma.cc/4T44-SFR2]. 
 120. Shawn Musgrave, A Vast Hidden Surveillance Network Runs Across 
America, Powered by the Repo Industry, BETABOS. (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://www.betaboston.com/news/2014/03/05/a-vast-hidden-surveillance-network-
runs-across-america-powered-by-the-repo-industry/ [https://perma.cc/2FAX-RMGB]; 
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DRN collects data from thousands of private citizens who 
volunteer to mount ALPR cameras on their cars.121  When the ALPR 
cameras spot a stolen vehicle, DRN pays the private citizen $200-
$400.122  Vigilant Solutions’ collection of license plate records from 
law enforcement also incorporates data from DRN.123  Vigilant 
Solutions’ ability to leverage DRN’s commercial collection of license 
plate records has created a database of over five billion license plate 
hits.124  Other large providers of license plate services include L3 
Mobile-Vision and ELSAG.125  ELSAG LPRs are used by over 5000 
law enforcement agencies around the world.126 
But even if you allow drone companies to collect information that 
is not readily exposed to the public, law enforcement may still have 
easy access to it without a warrant.  This is the case with social media.  
Many law enforcement agencies pay for social media monitoring.127  
The social media monitoring companies often get direct access to all 
the social media from a particular social media site, even to those 
users who limit public access to their social media.  The social media 
monitoring companies provide access to law enforcement to the data 
and tools to analyze it all and do so with no warrant from the police 
because of the third-party doctrine discussed above. 
                                                                                                                                         
see also Shawn Musgrave, Massive License Plate Location Database Just Like 
Instagram, Digital Recognition Network Insists, BETABOS. (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://www.betaboston.com/news/2014/03/05/massive-license-plate-location-database-
just-like-instagram-digital-recognition-network-insists/ [https://perma.cc/9F43-T2UC]. 
 121. Gil Aegerter, License Plate Data Not Just For Cops:  Private Companies Are 
Tracking Your Car, NBC NEWS (Jul. 19, 2013, 4:44 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/other/license-plate-data-not-just-cops-private-companies-are-tracking-
f6C10684677 [https://perma.cc/N8PM-CX2F]. 
 122. Elizabeth Kreft, Surveillance For Hire:  Would You Take Money to Record 
Fellow Drivers?, BLAZE (Mar. 6, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/news/
2014/03/06/surveillance-for-hire-would-you-take-money-to-record-fellow-drivers/ 
[https://perma.cc/S5EE-6T5N]. 
 123. DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, supra note 118. 
 124. VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/license-
plate-recognition-lpr/ [https://perma.cc/96C3-HXY4]. 
 125. L3 MOBILE-VISION, http://www.mobile-vision.com/products/alertvu/ 
[https://perma.cc/TVL7-YGE4]; 
ELSAG, https://www.elsag.com [https://perma.cc/AB2X-FB36]. 
 126. Kim Zetter, Even The FBI Had Privacy Concerns On License Plate Readers, 
WIRED (May 15, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/even-fbi-privacy-
concerns-license-plate-readers/ [https://perma.cc/5559-RCP4]. 
 127. Map:  Social Media Monitoring by Police Department, Cities, and Counties, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/map-social-media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-and-counties 
[https://perma.cc/LDF8-3JY2]. 
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Drones have the potential to make aggregation of commercial 
surveillance data of public space big business.  Drones are, in one 
sense, merely aerial surveillance platforms that can be loaded with an 
array of surveillance equipment.  There are numerous identifiers that 
can be used to track individuals in public, including license plate 
readers as well as facial recognition technology and technology that 
can collect the MAC addresses that each mobile phone can be 
uniquely identified by.128  Without protections for privacy in public, 
our physical public space will mirror online surfing where numerous 
entities are looking to track information about you as long as you are 
in public space. 
V.  IMPORTANCE OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC 
The concept of “privacy in public” can seem like an oxymoron at 
first glance, but the concept is absolutely essential to a well-
functioning democracy.  Privacy in public allows for self-realization;129 
it supports freedom of thought130 and associational rights;131 and 
privacy in public prevents conformity of thought and the chilling of 
speech,132 thus protecting the free market of ideas that is vital for 
proper democratic discourse. 
Traditional theories of privacy have focused on “securing intimate 
and personal realms.”133  The focus was on actual threats to 
privacy.134  Not until the rise of information technology and databases 
was there a perceived threat to privacy in public.135  Privacy in public 
was traditionally protected by economic and technological limitations 
that made public information largely obscure. 
In an age before information technology, it would have been 
extremely hard to collect, analyze, and retain large amounts of public 
information over a long period of time for just one person, let alone 
millions.  Aggregating disparate public records and surveilling the 
public activities of one individual would take a great deal of 
                                                                                                                                         
 128. See generally supra notes 1-6. 
 129. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
26, 37 (1976) (“I shall myself argue that the right to privacy is fundamentally 
connected to personhood.”). 
 130. Id. at 39. 
 131. Id. at 30. 
 132. Id. at 43. 
 133. See Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public:  
Challenges of Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207 (1997). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142 
(2014). 
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resources.  The practical obscurity of actions in public meant large 
scale surveillance of public space was a minimal concern at best.  But 
we are increasingly losing this obscurity and drones threaten to 
abolish it and make indiscriminate mass surveillance in public space 
an everyday occurrence. 
Joel Reidenberg has used obscurity as a starting to point to 
understand the loss of privacy in public.  Reidenberg describes this 
loss of practical privacy in three stages:  (1) obscurity, (2) accessibility, 
and (3) transparency.136  The obscurity stage precedes mass 
deployment of information technologies and preserves privacy in 
public through the sheer difficulty and cost of traditional 
surveillance.137  The accessibility stage implements the technology 
that makes personal information accessible to the public.138  Consider 
the ubiquity of cameras—from closed-circuit television to cell phones 
in everyone’s hands—that can take pictures and record video. The 
digitization of public records would be another example.139  The 
transparency stage takes all this newly accessible information and 
makes it readily available through technologies like search engines, 
social media sites, or large databases of license plate data.140 
Drones threaten to make our activities in public both more 
accessible and more transparent, as all the data from the drones ends 
up in large, searchable databases for commercial exploitation.  
Drones will not only make public activities accessible and transparent 
but if the information drones collect is used to create databases, the 
data will be analyzed by sophisticated algorithms that derive 
additional information value.141 
In the age of domestic drones, obscurity and privacy in public need 
to be protected.  Privacy in public is vital to our democracy.  We must 
continue to allow practical obscurity in public space to protect our 
privacy.  Where we allow our public spaces to become bastions of 
mass surveillance we will see a slow degradation of civic engagement 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 148. 
 138. Id. at 148-49. 
 139. See, e.g., Anna Forrester, FBI Completes Digitization of Criminal, Civil 
Identity Records, EXEC. GOV’T (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.executivegov.com/
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 140. See Reidenberg, supra note 135, at 150. 
 141. See Bracken-Roche et al., supra note 57, at 46 (“Mass data collection afforded 
through the persistent data capture capabilities of UAVs can . . . collect a wealth of 
‘ambient’ information across a wide range of terrestrial environments, including the 
people, objects, and behaviours that are occurring within them.”). 
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in public space.142  As drones are increasingly deployed in our 
National Airspace, become more sophisticated, and mass surveillance 
of public spaces increases, it will have a detrimental impact on our 
democracy.143  It is imperative that drone privacy is addressed now by 
the FAA as the agency integrates drones into the National Airspace. 
VI.  WHY THE FAA SHOULD REGULATE DRONES 
Drones pose a unique threat to privacy.  The FAA has not only 
acknowledged this threat to privacy, but the agency has even 
suggested that addressing this threat is necessary to integrating drones 
into the National Airspace.144  Yet, the agency has either claimed that 
addressing privacy is outside the scope of the agency’s work because 
its mission focuses on safety145 or that the FAA Modernization Act 
does not require the agency to address privacy.146  Though the agency 
has acknowledged the possible relationship between safety and 
privacy,147 it fails to recognize the extent to which addressing privacy 
is necessary to safely integrate drones. 
A. Privacy Must be Addressed to Safely Integrate Drones into the 
National Airspace 
Without adequate drone privacy rules, self-help methods for 
protecting privacy will create the very safety risks the FAA seeks to 
avoid.  In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for small drones, the 
FAA identified two safety concerns.  First was the risk of drone 
operation without “the ability to see manned aircraft in the air in time 
to prevent a mid-air collision between the [drone] and another 
aircraft.”148  Second was a “loss of positive control” over the 
operability of a drone “due to a failure of the control link between the 
aircraft and the operator’s control station.”149  The FAA states that 
                                                                                                                                         
 142. We’ve already seen this online after the Edward Snowden revelations. See 
generally PEN AM. CTR., GLOBAL CHILLING:  THE IMPACT OF MASS SURVEILLANCE 
ON INTERNATIONAL WRITERS 5, 8 (2016), www.pen.org/sites/default/files/global
chilling_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L6E-J6GU]. 
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Reg. 9544, 9548 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015). 
 149. Id. at 9549. 
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the loss of positive control “could pose a significant risk to persons, 
property, or other aircraft.”150 
In response to the privacy fears surrounding drone surveillance, 
commercial industry has responded with privacy protective measures 
for individuals that can lead to loss of positive control and 
subsequently pose a significant risk to persons and property.  One of 
these solutions is known as geo-fencing.  Geo-fencing designates a 
specific geographic area as restricted air space.151  The drones that are 
programmed to respect geo-fenced areas can be forced to avoid these 
restricted areas or even forced to land if they enter a restricted area—
removing positive control from the drone operator.  Some individuals 
opt for a more direct self-help option when encountering drones on or 
near their property.  The concerns over privacy have resulted in 
individuals shooting down drones with guns,152 a self-help method 
that has obvious risks, especially in densely populated urban areas. 
When individuals and drone manufactures are left with no option 
other than to defend their privacy interests, they will create 
technologies and react in ways that make operating drones less safe.  
The privacy, property, and security interests behind the development 
of geo-fencing and the shooting down of drones are just two examples 
of why it is unreasonable to separate drone privacy from safety, and 
why the FAA must address privacy prior to authorizing widespread 
drone deployment. 
B. The FAA Modernization Act Requires the FAA to Address 
Privacy Issues 
Congress required the FAA to develop a Comprehensive Plan with 
specific recommendations for a rulemaking to “define the acceptable 
standards of operation and certification” of drones and to “establish 
standards and requirements for the operator[s] and pilot[s]” of 
                                                                                                                                         
 150. Id. 
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drones, as well as to identify “the best methods to ensure safe 
operation” of drones in the National Airspace.153  The 
recommendations of the Comprehensive Plan were to be 
implemented by a notice and comment rulemaking. 
In the FAA’s Comprehensive Plan, the agency made clear that 
privacy issues need to “be taken into consideration as [drones] are 
integrated into the NAS.”154  The agency acknowledged that 
“concerns” about how drone operations impact privacy will “grow 
stronger” as “demand for [drones] increases.”155  The FAA 
specifically identified the work on drone test site rules as a way to 
“inform future rulemaking activities and other policy decisions 
related to safety, privacy, and economic growth.”156  The agency 
proposed that the “lessons learned and best practices established at 
the test sites may be applied more generally to protect privacy in 
[drone] operations throughout the [National Airspace].”157 
Congress was clear in its mandate to the FAA to conduct “a notice 
of proposed rulemaking to implement the recommendations of the 
[Comprehensive] plan.”158  The FAA identified privacy in the 
Comprehensive Plan as one of the issues necessary to address for 
drone integration159 and consequently the Act required the FAA to 
address privacy in its rulemaking to implement the Comprehensive 
Plan. 
Indeed, Congress expected the FAA to address privacy.  In an 
Explanatory Statement that accompanied the 2014 Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, Congress required the FAA to conduct a drone 
privacy study, stating: 
Without adequate safeguards, expanded use of UAS and their 
integration into the national airspace raise a host of concerns with 
respect to the privacy of individuals. For this reason, the FAA is 
directed to conduct a study on the implications of UAS integration 
into national airspace on individual privacy.160 
The report specifically required the FAA to study “how the FAA 
can address the impact of widespread use of UAS on individual 
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privacy as it prepares to facilitate the integration of UAS into the 
national airspace.”161  The report was to be submitted to Congress 
within eighteen months of enactment of that appropriations bill and 
completed “well in advance of the FAA’s schedule for developing 
final regulations on the integration of UAS into the national 
airspace.”162  Nearly forty months later the report still has not been 
submitted to Congress.  The FAA continues to avoid addressing 
privacy as Congress required the agency to do. 
CONCLUSION 
The FAA is the administrative agency with the statutory authority 
to issue drone operation licenses and maintain order in the National 
Airspace.163  It is the most appropriate agency to oversee 
comprehensive privacy rules and regulations for drone operators.  
The FAA is uniquely positioned to ensure that transparency, 
accountability, and other privacy-protective principles of data 
collection are built in to the drone authorization process. 
The integration of drones represents a pivotal moment to address 
the privacy implications of new technology prior to that technology 
saturating society.  There are many things the FAA could do to 
mitigate the privacy risks posed by drones.  Perhaps the most 
important thing the agency could do is demand public transparency:  
transparency in the surveillance technology and its capabilities that 
drones will carry, transparency in any collection, use, retention, or 
distribution of sensitive or personal information, and transparency of 
any algorithmic analysis of the information that seeks to glean 
personal or sensitive information from more innocuous data that has 
been collected. 
Drones represent a unique threat to our public spaces that has 
received much publicity, and if we fail to proactively set baseline 
privacy safeguards for drones, we have little chance of addressing the 
privacy implications of other technologies that threaten to undermine 
our privacy. 
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